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I. Introduction
On November 9, 2009, the European Court of Human Rights
I Lautsi v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06, EUR. CT. H.R. (Nov. 3, 2009),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc. This decision was reversed as this note was set to
go to print. The reversal is addressed in the final section of the article; given the
circumstances, the article largely refers to and cites the 2009 decision; the facts and law
addressed in the reversal remain unchanged, however.
t Robert Lamb graduated cum laude from the University of North Carolina with a B.A.
in English Literature in 2001. After several years working as a wilderness guide and
managing a non-profit education program in Africa, he returned to U.N.C. for law
school. While at school he volunteered often through the school's pro-bono program,
managed the annual public interest auction, and was a member of the Broun National
Trial Team and the staff of the Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation,
for which he wrote this note.
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(hereinafter "ECHR") made a decision that sent shockwaves
through the various European nations over which it presides. 2 It
decided that the Italian Republic, home to the Vatican and heir to
the Holy Roman Empire, was violating the human rights of its
citizens by displaying crucifixes in its state schools.' The Italian
government immediately renounced the decision, stating that its
sovereignty was being challenged by the court.' The Vatican
chastised political leaders for promoting secularism over morality,
and hundreds of individual voices erupted from the social network
ether to declare that they opposed the decision of the ECHR.'
Italy was joined by ten European nations, thirty-three members of
the European Parliament, and several non-governmental
organizations' in its appeal of the case to the Grand Chamber,
granted in March 2010.' Ultimately the political strength of these
many voices won out, as the Grand Chamber overturned the
original decision 15-2.8 The reversal rested not in law, but in
politics, as the majority ceded its authority to decide the issue to
Italian state, holding that there was no international consensus on
the issue.
Yet, for all the political turmoil the original 2009 decision
2 See Nathan Greenlaugh, When a Cross Isn't a Cross, BALTIC REPORTS (Jan. 13,
2010), http://balticreports.com/?p=7933 (reporting the response of other Catholic states);
see also Lautsi v Italy - A Lost Opportunity, EUROPEAN HUMANIST FED'N,
http://www.humanistfederation.eu/index.php?option=comcontent&view-article&id=27
7 (last visited Mar. 26, 2011) (reporting protests of the decision and the intervention of
several European governments in the appeal).
3 See Lautsi, App. No. 30814/06, EUR. CT. H.R. 57.
4 See John Hooper, Human Rights Ruling against Classroom Crucifixes Angers
Italy, GUARDIAN (Nov. 3, 2009), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/nov/03/italy-
classroom-crucifixes-human-rights.
5 Id.
6 Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion: Lautsi v. Italy, THE EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT PLATFORM FOR SECULARISM IN POLITICS,
http://politicsreligion.eu/news/lautsi-v-italy/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2011).
7 Press Release, European Court of Human Rights, Crucifix: The Case of Lautsi v
Italy Will Be Examined By The Court's Grand Chamber (Mar. 2, 2010),
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?action=html&documentId=863761&portal=h
bkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF0 1 C 1166DEA3986
49.
8 Lautsi v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06, EUR. CT. H.R. 71-77 (Grand Chamber,
Mar. 18, 2011), http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc.
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ignited, it was a product of well-formed precedent; its reasoning
drew not one dissenting opinion from the court.9 First, relying on
a strong line of cases condemning non-objective, pluralistic
religious teaching, the ECHR found that the display of the crucifix
is a decidedly lopsided promotion of Christianity in schools.'o In
so doing, the decision directly rejected the Italian government's
proposition that the crucifix is less a religious symbol and more a
symbol of Italian heritage, something that, by hanging in every
public classroom, necessarily unifies its young citizens in one
common spirit." The decision built on precedent, defining
religious teaching by finding that even religious symbols are
considered part of a state's attempt to inculcate religious values. 2
Finally, the decision affirmed its support for a unified secular state
by disapproving of any message that would alienate or create
hardship for those choosing not to believe in religion.13
Each step of the original decision rested firmly in the words of
the European Convention on Human Rights and previous
decisions of the Court, but together they manifested a tipping point
for citizens opposed to the rising secular voice of the ECHR.14
Ultimately the religious traditionalists won the political battle, as
the Grand Chamber cited the 'margin of appreciation doctrine' to
find that this decision was beyond the reach of the court." While
the margin of appreciation doctrine does exist in controlling
precedent, its use by the Grand Chamber signals a willingness to
diminish the court's own power. Ultimately, the battle in Lautsi
was not a legal battle: the judicial findings of the original decision
were sound, as this note will show. However, Lautsi became a
political battle, one in which the principles of neutrality called for
in the Convention lost to the political sovereignty of religious
European states.
9 See Lautsi, App. No. 30814/06, EuR. CT. H.R. 1.
10 See id. ? 56.
11 See id 51.
12 See id T 52.
13 See id 55 ("[n]egative freedom of religion is not restricted to the absence of
religious services or religious education").
14 Ligia de Jesus, The Cross Versus the Court, WASH. TIMEs (Dec. 23, 2010),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/201 0/dec/23/the-cross-v-the-court/ (depicting
the proliferation of amicus curiae positions before the ECHR Grand Chamber appeal).
15 See Lautsi, App. No. 30814/06, EuR. CT. H.R. T 69 (Grand Chamber).
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Part II of this note examines the ECHR's decision by
providing an overview of the facts that would be useful in
understanding the case. Part III includes the relevant legal
background for understanding the Italian state's stance and the
precedent on which the court in Lautsi relied. Part IV analyzes the
court's original 2009 decision with reference to the legal traditions
discussed in Part III. Part V briefly provides a useful comparison
to the U.S. Supreme Court's struggle with religious freedoms in
the public education setting, providing some perspective for the
political struggle that informs the Grand Chamber's reversal,
which is discussed in Part VI.
II. Overview of the Facts and Procedure of the Case
At the case's initiation, the plaintiff, Soile Lautsi, a Finnish
mother, lived in Italy with her eleven and thirteen year old sons."
The boys attended the Istituto Vittorino da Feltre, a public school
in Abano Terme. " Ms. Lautsi found the school's display of
crucifixes in each classroom detrimental to the religiously-neutral
principles which she wished to instill in her children.'" She voiced
her concern at a meeting held by the school, emphasizing that the
Italian courts had recently ruled the presence of a crucifix in
election stations was contrary to the State's proclaimed
secularism. 19
The school's administrators, however, found her request less
compelling than the virtues they believed the symbol instilled in
their pupils, and took no action to change the display of the
crucifix in classrooms.2 0 Ms. Lautsi then brought suit in the
Administrative Court, asserting that the school's position violated
the secular declarations of Articles 3 and 19 of the Italian
Constitution and Article 9 of the European Convention on Human
Rights. 2' The case was transferred to Italy's Constitutional Court,
a separate jurisdiction from the Administrative Court, to address
16 Id 6.
17 Id
18 See id 7 (characterizing Lautsi's preference for neutrality as a preference for
secularism).
19 See id 7 (citing Cass., sez. IV, I marzo 2000, n. 4273, DE 2000, II, 217 (It.).
20 See de Jesus, supra note 14, 8.
21 Id. 9.
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the constitutional violations alleged by the plaintiff. 22 On the
constitutional issue, the government defended its actions by
maintaining that the presence of crucifixes in classrooms is
"natural," as the crucifix is not just a religious symbol, but the
"banner of the Catholic Church," the only church mentioned in the
Italian Constitution.2 3 Such stature makes the crucifix a symbol of
Italian patriotism. 24
In an interesting and now infamous procedural wrinkle, the
Italian Constitutional Court refused to resolve the constitutional
conflict. In December 2004, the Court held that it did not have
jurisdiction because the issue was an administrative law question
rather than a constitutional one: the plaintiffs primary complaint
concerned regulations compelling the school to display the cross.2 5
The case was remanded to the Administrative Court, which
dismissed the application in March 2005.26 It held that the crucifix
was a symbol of "Italian history and culture and therefore of
Italian identity."2 7 It also found that the crucifix represented
"principles of equality, freedom, and tolerance" that underlie "the
State's secular basis." 28 The plaintiffs appeal was dismissed at
the highest level of state administrative jurisdiction but never
returned to the Constitutional Court.29 In the procedural handling
of the case, the Italian courts never addressed the conflict between
the Italian Constitution, with its explicit secular ideals, and a
national identity, with a strong religious heritage that would be
difficult to surrender without feeling that Italian sovereignty is
threatened.
Such an unresolved conflict was not lost on Ms. Lautsi and her
attorneys. The plaintiff continued to seek redress for her claim in




25 Id T 12.
26 See de Jesus, supra note 14, T 13.
27 Id
28 Id.
29 See id. 15 (noting Lautsi's appeal to the Consiglio di Stato without any
subsequent procedure).
30 Id. T 1.
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Article 9 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms. 3 Her case was accepted in the
European court based on the factual development.32 Even as the
higher court accepted this complaint, the Italian state attempted to
bolster its own courts' decisions: The Italian Ministry of
Education adopted additional directives recommending that school
principals display crucifixes to cultivate virtue, citing historic
decrees made before the modem Italian state was formed.33 The
Ministry then joined the case, arguing that these royal decrees pre-
dating the constitution mandated crucifixes in every classroom and
that the schools were merely following what had long been a
national position.34
III. Legal Background
A. Italian Domestic Law and the Role ofReligion in the
Italian State
The justification for the argument that crucifixes are in
classrooms more for "Italian" reasons than "religious" reasons
rests on the fact that mandates to place them in classrooms
predates the creation of the Italian state. A decree dating back to
1860 required that "each school without fail be equipped . .. with
a crucifix."" When Italy was formed as a nation state, the Roman
Catholic Church was officially bound to its national identity.36
When modem fascist views began gaining political strength in
the 1900s, the Italian government issued a series of decrees
continuing the obligation to display crucifixes in classrooms in
hopes of bolstering a sense of Italian nationalism among its
citizens.37 Deploring the removal of religious portraits from the
public school classrooms, the Italian government demanded these
31 Id. 27.
32 See id..
33 See id. 10.
34 See id. (citing R.D. 30 aprile 1924 n. 965, art. 118 (It.) and R.D. 26 aprile 1928
n. 1297, art. 119 (It.)).
35 Id. 16 (quoting R.D. Reg. Piemonte-Sardegna 15 settembre 1860 n. 4336, art.
140 (It.)).
36 Id. 17.
37 Id. T 19.
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portraits be returned because they were essential to the education
the state intended to provide." In the 1920s, the Italian Ministry
of Education circulated two decrees that mandated crucifixes be
placed in every public school classroom to help cultivate the virtue
and character that public schools sought to afford the nation's
youth.3 9 The Italian National Court's ruling in Lautsi held that
those decrees are still in force today and apply in the present case.
For procedural reasons, however, the Court did not directly
address this conflict with the secular Constitution.4 0
The argument for the national importance of these crucifixes
and the real disagreement between Italy and the ECHR runs
deeper than the mandate of the two decrees. Since its inception,
the Italian State has been intertwined with the Catholic Church,
and during the 1920s, the Lateran Pacts legally solidified this
relationship. 41 Catholicism was confirmed as Italy's official
religion.42 Non-Catholic religions were allowed to organize but
only as long as they did not subvert the aims of the State (and by
reason of association, the Catholic Church).4 3
Not until 1985 was the Lateran Treaty amended to dissolve the
status of the Catholic Church as the only religion of the Italian
State." Modern reforms have secularized the constitution to some
degree, and the Italian Constitutional Court's more recent
interpretations confirm the move towards secularization. 4
Textually, the Italian Constitution has replaced Catholic values
with equality among all citizens.4 6 It has also replaced the primacy
of the Catholic Church with an equal stance toward all religions
under the law.47 The Constitutional Court has explicitly found that
the actual curriculum and teaching in public schools should be
38 See de Jesus, supra note 14, 119.
39 Id. fT 19-20.
40 See Lautsi, App. No. 30814/06, EuR. CT. H.R.
41 Id. 21.
42 Id.
43 Id. T 22.
44 Id. T 23.
45 See Lautsi, App. No. 30814/06, EuR. CT. H.R. 24-25.
46 Art. 3 Costituzione (It.).
47 Id. at Art. 8.
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secular rather than based on the views of Catholicism.4 8
However, because the Italian Constitutional Court refused to
address the issues in Lautsi, it avoided the conflict between its
own precedent and the State's stance. Rather than deciding the
constitutionality of these mandates, the Constitutional Court
directed the Administrative Court to decide the administrative law
issues. The equivocation of the Constitutional Court belies
reluctance among Italians to embrace equality and freedom of
religion at the risk of leaving behind the vestiges of traditions that
have for so long united the Italian people.
B. Religion and Education Under the European Court of
Human Rights
The Italian Constitution's transition to secularism is part of a
longer journey that began after World War II. Growing out of a
European desire to enter a new era of peace founded on equality
and mutual respect for cultural difference, Italy became a
signatory to the European Human Rights Convention.49 Like all
states bound to that convention, Italy is subject to judgment by the
ECHR, which decided the Lautsi case for violations of treaty
provisions. 5o Over the last several decades, the ECHR has
developed a line of cases concerning educational and religious
freedom based in Article Two of the First Protocol and Article 9 of
the Convention, which read respectively:
[Protocol One, Article 2]
No person shall be denied the right to education. In the
exercise of any functions which it assumes in relation to
education and to teaching, the State shall respect the right
of parents to ensure such education and teaching in
48 Lautsi, App. No. 30814/06, EUR. CT. H.R. 47.
49 Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Signature Table (Mar. 24, 2011, 9:15 AM),
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=005&CL=ENG.
For a more comprehensive guide to the convention, see also, CLARE OVEY & ROBIN
WHITE: The European Convention on Human Rights (4th ed. Oxford University Press
2006).
50 See Lautsi, App. No. 30814/06, EUR. CT. H.R.
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conformity with their own religious and philosophical
convictions."
[Section One, Article 9]
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought,
conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to
change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in
community with others and in public or private, to manifest
his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and
observance.52
2. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be
subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law
and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
public safety, for the protection of public order, health or
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of
others."
Article 2 requires that a state's public education advance
interests necessary for pluralistic, open democracies.5 4 Reading
both sentences of Article 9 as one idea, the court has found that the
protection of individual convictions can only be compromised by a
state interest in protecting the rights and interests of others.5 In
education cases, the tenets of each article complement each other,
serving to preserve the right to education for every child while at
the same time assuring that that right should not encroach upon or
be destroyed by equally legitimate interests in protecting an
individual's religious beliefs. 56 The ECHR has also defined the
specific rights preserved by Article 2 and 9 through statutory
51 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, protocol 1, art. 2, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 005, 213 U.N.T.S. 221
[hereinafter European Human Rights Convention].
52 Id. § 1, art. 9.
53 Id.
54 Kjeldsen v. Denmark, App. Nos. 5095/71, 5920/72, 5926/72, 1 EUR. H.R. REP.
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interpretation. Analyzing both, the court has found that the term
"belief," found in Article 9, and "conviction" in Article 2 are
virtually synonymous, referring to principles which are serious,
deeply held, and well-articulated."
While the ideals of the ECHR are fairly clear in their language,
the articles are broad, and their application is often at odds with
the traditions of the various nations that have signed the
convention. 5 Weighing a variety of cultures and states with
various dispositions towards religion, the court has always
returned to the principle that states must respect an individual's
convictions.60 However, it has tried to defer to each nation's
interest in preserving its religious traditions when deciding what it
means for the state to respect an individual's religion.6 1 More
recently, in the realm of religious freedom and education, the court
has moved away from deferring to state decisions about what is
62
democratically necessary and towards finding a secular solution.
57 See, e.g., Campbell v. United Kingdom, App. 7511/76, 48 EUR. CT. H.R. 1, 16
(1982).
58 Id. 36.
59 See Memorandum from Gr6gor Puppink, Dir., European Ctr. for Law and
Justice, ECHR - Lautsi v. Italy § I (Apr. 2010), http://www.eclj.org/pdf/ECLJ-MEMO-
LAUTSI-ITALY-ECHR-PUPPINCK.pdf (describing the 'margin of appreciation'
doctrine which allows the various countries of Europe some degree of variability in
adhering to the rules of the Convention while respecting state traditions).
60 See, e.g., Valsamis v. Greece, App. No. 21787/93, 1996-VI EUR. CT. H.R. 2313,
2324, (stating that the "[Convention] forbids the State 'to pursue an aim of indoctrination
that might be regarded as not respecting parents' religious and philosophical
convictions").
61 See Angeleni v. Sweden, App. No. 10491/83, 51 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. &
Rep. 41 (1986). (The court refused to grant an exception to the daughter of an atheist
mother because the government-mandated course on religious knowledge had a
legitimate aim in providing all children with some education in the subject). See also
Sahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98, (EUR. CT. H.R. June 29, 2004) 100 (preliminary
objection) ("As is well established by [the Court's] case-law, the national authorities are
in principle better placed than an international court to evaluate local needs and
conditions").
62 See Buscarini v. San Marino, App. No. 24645/94, 1999-1 EUR. CT. H.R. 605
(denying the state's long standing tradition of swearing in public leaders with oath to the
Holy Gospels). Also compare Kjeldsen, App. No. 5095/71, 23 EUR. CT. H.R. (ser. A)
(balancing the rights of parents to ensure that a sex education course conforms with their
Christian convictions) with Folgere v. Norway, App. No. 15472/02, 46 EuR. H.R. REP.
1147 (2007) (addressing the rights of parents to exempt their children from a mandatory
primary school course on Christianity, religion, and philosophy).
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When looking at Article 2 claims, the court has consistently
held that any attempt by the state to indoctrinate students in a
particular religion violates Article 2." However, in deference to
the cultural traditions of individual states, the court has found that
if a proper balance between majority and minority religions can be
reached, the ideals of pluralism can still be embraced even where
one religion figures more prominently in the curriculum.'
A number of parents have turned to the ECHR to exempt their
students from classes they find contradictory to their religious
beliefs. 65 The court has examined the facts of each case by
balancing the government's interests against parental rights
subject to Article 2.66 Deference to state decisions about education
marked the court's decisions for several years, and the court found
that parents whose convictions conflicted with state educational
decisions could pursue private alternatives. 67 However, more
recently, the court has been less accepting of state educational
decisions that exclude children based on their convictions, finding
that states fail to meet their obligation to educate all children under
Article 2 if some students are forced away by religious
convictions.6 8
C. Religious Symbols in the Educational Setting
While a wealth of case law exists concerning violations of
Articles 2 and 9 based on school curriculum or mandatory
activities, little exists concerning religious symbols in the school
63 Kjeldsen, 23 EUR. CT. H.R. (ser. A) at 26,1 53.
64 Id.; Folgero, 46 EUR. H.R. REP. at 1162, T 38.
65 See, e.g., Kjeldsen, 23 EUR. CT. H.R. (ser. A).
66 See, e.g., id. (weighing the State's interest in providing sex education, which
served the purpose of supplying students with useful information intended to curtail the
excessive birth rate out of wedlock, against the fact that the course offended Christian
parents' religious and philosophical convictions).
67 See Valsamis, 1996-VI EUR. CT. H.R. (denying an exemption from a school-wide
parade celebrating the State's military victory, which offended parents' pacifist religion,
on the basis that the child's obligation to attend the parade did not deprive her parents of
supplying the child with their own guidance and religious/philosophical knowledge); see
also Kjeldsen, 23 EuR. CT. H.R. (ser. A) at 27-28, 54 (denying an exemption from a
sex education course because parents could enroll their children in the State's heavily
subsidized private schools, which were not bound by the strict obligations of the public
school).
68 Folgero, 46 EuR. H.R. REP. at 1193, T 101.
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setting.6 9 Sahin v. Turkey provides the only defining precedent on
the Court's view of religious symbols in the educational setting,
though it involves almost opposite facts to the present case.70 In
Sahin, the Court examines a Turkish university's ban on religious
headgear.7 Sahin, a member of the faculty of the medical school,
brought a suit under Article 9, claiming that her religious freedoms
were violated.72 The story of Lautsi is thus inverted, because the
State promoted a secular interest, and the individual expressed a
religious interest.
The ECHR's analysis began by observing that no agreement
existed between the various European governments on how to
address religious symbols or clothing in public schools.7 ' Relying
on applications of Article 2 and Article 9, it modified the
balancing test between the necessity of the state's action to support
the interest of its democracy, and the gravity of the infringement
on the individual. 74 The court looked closely at the secular interest
expressed by the Turkish government in support of the ban.
Once the court determined the interest to be secular, and thus
aligned with Article 9 freedoms, the ECHR looked at whether the
ban on religious headgear was appropriately tailored to meet the
state's interest while infringing as little as possible on the
individual's rights. The court upheld the ban for several reasons.
First it observed that the broad ban on headscarves and beards that
had originally inspired the suit had been re-written to include all
overt symbols of religion, especially religious clothing.7 The
court also found that the ban had been formed after many years of
discussion and debate, both in the administration and the Turkish
courts. 8 Lastly, the court observed that the modest and flexible
69 See discussion infra Part III.B.
70 Sahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98, 2005-XI EuR. CT. H.R. 173.
71 Id. 16.
72 Id. T 18.
73 Id. 55-65.
74 See id. 110.
75 See Sahin, 2005-XI EuR. CT. H.R. at 206-207, T 116.
76 See id. 117.
77 Id 47.
78 Id. T 120.
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sanctions manifested a will to deal reasonably with the situation."
The ECHR thus relied on the decision making process, the interest
of the state, and the reasonableness of the measures taken in
concluding that the ban did not violate Article 9."o However, the
facts presented by Lautsi make for a much more difficult case
because the state's interest, while rich in national tradition, is not
secular, creating a seeming paradox of the argument so easily
solved in Sahin.
IV. Analysis
A. Objective, Pluralistic Teaching
Following the precedent of cases concerning the juxtaposition
of public education and personal convictions, the ECHR's first
step in Lautsi was to stress the importance of objective, pluralistic
teaching in maintaining a democratic society. " Objective
teaching, especially in the context of religious education, assures
that no particular group is persecuted or maligned.82 The court
took a stronger stance than it had in earlier cases, however, finding
that necessity of the state to provide objective teaching becomes
even stronger in a majority-religion state like Italy, where minority
views are likely to be easily suppressed.83
The care with which the state must maintain neutrality and
objectivity in teaching is also heightened by the sensitivity of a
young child's mind.84 As the court observed:
The schooling of children is a particularly sensitive area in
which the compelling power of the State is imposed on
minds which still lack (depending on the child's level of
maturity) the critical capacity which would enable them to
keep their distance from the message derived from a
79 Id.
80 See Sahin, 2005-XI EUR. CT. H.R. at 208, 1 122.
81 Lautsi v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06, EUR. CT. H.R. 50 (Nov. 3, 2009),
http://www.echr.coe.intlechr/en/hudoc.
82 Lautsi, App. No. 30814/06, EuR. CT. H.R. 48. See supra text accompanying
note 58.
83 Lautsi, App. No. 30814/06, EuR. CT. H.R. 50. Compare Folgero, supra note 62
(finding that even though Christianity was given primacy in the curriculum, the teaching
was still objective as it introduced other religions.)
84 See Lautsi, App. No. 30814/06, EUR. CT. H.R. 48.
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preference manifested by the State in religious matters.
Relying more on reasoning than precedent, the court
concluded that the children's age in Lautsi made their
exposure to religious symbol more likely to impress upon them
the importance of one religion."6
B. Rejection of the Predominantly Secular Meaning of the
Crucifix
The court was especially blunt in its rejection of the Italian
government's stance on the civic value of the crucifix.87 Finding
that the Catholic Church holds the symbol of the crucifix to have a
deep, fundamental meaning, the court refuted the proposition that
this meaning would not be pressed upon the young minds in the
classroom. " While the court did not explicitly deny that the
crucifix holds secular meaning as well, it refused to recognize
Italy's use of the crucifix to cultivate nationalism."
It is readily apparent why the court found that the crucifix
would be interpreted by students in classrooms as a religious
symbol." However, the rejection of the democratic necessity of
the state to display it as a symbol of its heritage and nationalism is
a stronger stance by the court against the individual decisions of
the sovereign states over which it presides.9 1 It is precisely this
stance that has so inflamed political leaders, who decry the move
away from providing some "margin of appreciation" of each
country's traditions.92 However, the court's stance is demanded by
the particular facts and circumstances of the case. The reasoning






90 The argument that the crucifix is not to be interpreted as a religious symbol is
facially barren; see, e.g., ENCYCOPEDIA BRITANNICA, Cross (Religious Symbol),
(Encyclopedia Britannica, 2003). ("The cross is thus a sign both of Christ himself and of
the faith of Christians").
91 Compare Puppink, supra note 59 and accompanying text.
92 See Puppink, supra note 59, at 2 (finding the Court in error for demanding a
secular stance of a traditionally religious state, the author seeks to promote a pluralism
that would allow one religion primacy as long as others are tolerated).
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to a single religious ideology than the national interests the court
has examined in previous cases concerning governmental interest
and the individual's rejection of state-mandated activities.9 3
Since its inception, the court has had to balance the ideals of
equality, egalitarianism and the national traditions of each
country.94 As Europe has moved to a more centralized state, the
power of the court has grown, and the Court has deferred less to
the independent member interests of each of its states, resolving its
decisions based on the principles of the convention without regard
to traditional values of each state." While the court's previous
decisions have found compromise in exemption for particular
students or by finding that state's interests were not explicitly
religious, the particular facts of Lautsi forced the court to decide
whether a tradition that is undoubtedly religious should be allowed
if the state finds it necessary for the propagation of its particular
democracy.96
The decision the court faced was whether the protection of
pluralism and religious objectivity in Articles 2 and 9 could be
upheld when one religion was given primacy, even if it was not
explicitly taught for the purpose of indoctrination. While the court
has been firm in its rejection of indoctrination, it has taken a
shifting view of the "necessity" of quasi-religious states to
inculcate virtues in their classrooms through religious messages,
moving towards a more unified rule of secularism.9 7 While the
Lautsi ruling was hardly a leap from precedent, it expressly
confirmed the secular principles of the European Convention on
Human Rights over the moral principles of Christianity upon
which many European states are built."
The Italian government's argument appeared nuanced at first:
93 Compare Puppink, supra note 59 and accompanying text.
94 See Jim Murdoch, Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion, 9 HUMAN
RIGHTS HANDBOOKS 50 (Council of Europe 2007); see also OVEY & WHITE, supra note
49.
95 See Folgero v. Norway, App. No. 15472/02, 46 EUR. H.R. REP. 1147, T 99-101
(2009) (finding against Norway's will to give primacy to Christianity in a pluralistic
curriculum, despite the acknowledgment that Norway is a Christian religious state).
96 See id.
97 See Puppink, supra note 59.
98 See Lautsi v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06, EUR. CT. H.R. T 51 (Nov. 3, 2009).
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the State is justified in promoting the cross because the cross
predates the constitution.99 However, the real importance of the
argument, and the court's rejection of it as adequate justification
for the State's action, are central to understanding the tension that
has developed over the Lautsi decision. 100 The Italian State's
argument-if taken as more than sophisticated rationalization-is
that the modem Italian State is built on a constitution that grew out
of fundamentally Christian doctrines and decrees.o' Therefore,
the State is merely instilling a respect for the philosophical
heritage on which it was built by promoting the symbol of
Christianity in its classrooms. So, rejecting the democratic
necessity of this act is like rejecting the democratic necessity of
instilling a respect for the Italian national heritage. This line of
thinking is precisely what has drawn such support from other
religious European states and legal scholars.'0 2
C. Passive Religious Indoctrination
Equally troubling for many Europeans was the court's holding
that the mere presence of a religious symbol in a state-run
classroom is enough to be considered "persecuting" or
"disrespectful" of minority views.' In this respect, the court must
now extend its scant precedent on religiously symbolic clothing or
articles in the classroom.10 4 However, where the court in Sahin v.
Turkey affirmed the state's secular interest and rejected the
individual's interest in wearing religious clothing, in Lautsi v. Italy
the court must use the same reasoning as to the effect of religious
symbols in the classroom to reject the state's interest. 105 The
rejection of the state's interest is significant, as it condemns many
of the Christian states' traditions that are far from indoctrination or
requirements of allegiance to the state religion.'0 6
99 See discussion infra Part III.A.
100 See generally Puppink, supra note 59; see also de Jesus, supra note 14.
101 See Lautsi, App. No. 30814/06, EuR. CT. H.R. 37.
102 See generally Puppink, supra note 59.
103 See Greenlaugh, supra note 2 (noting Lithuania's prominent use of the Cross as a
state symbol).
104 See discussion infra Part III.C.
105 Sahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98, 2005-XI EUR. CT. H.R. 173.
106 See Greenlaugh, supra note 2 (noting the problems posed by the decision to
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The court also found that the fundamental meaning of the
crucifix would not be lost on the young minds that observe it, so
that it really was a tool of the state used in the classroom to make
impressions on the minds of the children forced to observe it.o7
The various state governments of Europe have different histories
of religious traditions, many of which persist in everyday
practice."os In fact, it is unclear whether the original purpose of the
new rights defined by the European Convention on Human Rights
were contrary to the then-existing historical and traditional
religious values of the European nations.' 09 But with this decision,
the new and old values have become more squarely opposed, as
even the vestiges of the once overtly religious government must be
wiped away so that the state is not violating the personal
convictions of citizens who are not members of the state
religion."
The court was careful to limit its decision to the educational
setting as a matter of rule."' It held that the use of symbols in the
classroom, even if present for historical reasons, extended beyond
the use of religious symbols in other parts of government, which it
had allowed in previous decisions." 2 However, its comments on
the subject were brief enough to leave the question open: what
traditions of state government will the court find to be an
affirmation of a particular religion by the state. " More
importantly, such an affirmation is specifically contrary to the
ideals of the convention under Article 9. Though the court limited
its discussion to the educational setting, its comments left an
Baltic state governments); see also de Jesus, supra, note 14 (opposing the secular
demands of the decision).
107 Lautsi v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06, EUR. CT. H.R.154 (Nov. 3, 2009).
108 See Hooper, supra note 4 (citing the longstanding Italian state entwinement with
religion); Greenlaugh, supra note 2 (observing the threat to Lithuanian heritage posed by
removing state sponsored crosses); see also Puppink, supra note 59 (calling for a more
permissive plurality that allows religious symbols to be used by states with religious
traditions).
109 Murdoch, supra note 94, at 9.
I10 Lautsi, App. No. 30814/06, EUR. CT. H.R. 52-53.
I1 Id.
112 Id.
113 See id. (citing dicta that historical gestures previously approved by the court
were nonetheless still viewed by the court as religious in nature).
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ambiguous stance towards governmental activity that is latently
religious in nature." 4
D. Negative Freedom of Religion
The final component of the court's analysis was its holding
that a negative freedom of religion, the right not to be confronted
with religion in public life, is protected by Article 9."' The court
voiced special concern for situations in which the state, in
affirming a particular religion, placed those with a preference for
no religion in the difficult position of having to make great
sacrifices to avoid religious messages. 116 In the educational
setting, since education is guaranteed by states adhering to the
convention, precedent has been that virtually any clear favoritism
for one religion in the classroom forces minority parties to go to
great lengths to avoid the religious message. "' Lautsi went
further, concluding that not only religious teaching, but also
religious symbols sponsored by the state, violate the human rights
of individuals who wish to believe in no religion."'
While voicing such overt approval of a negative freedom of
religion is clearly in line with the secular ideals of the convention,
the rising secular voice of the court is increasingly controversial."'
Not only individuals, but entire states find it problematic that the
ideals of the convention are being interpreted as favoring
secularism over religion. 120 The logic is that the objective,
pluralistic aim of society necessarily requires state neutrality on
religion.121 It is the second step that is difficult for many to
grapple with: what is state neutrality? If it is a preference for no
religious message or tradition over any religious one, the
114 Id.
It5 Id. 55.
116 Lautsi, App. No. 30814/06, EUR. CT. H.R. 55.
117 See Folgere v. Norway, App. No. 15472/02, 46 Eur. H.R Rep. 1147, 1190-93
(2007) (concluding that really any alternative provided by the state for those individuals
that wish to excuse themselves from non-objective religious teaching is ultimately too
burdensome to survive review).
118 Lautsi, App. No. 30814/06, EUR. CT. H.R. 55.
119 See de Jesus, supra note 14.
120 See generally Puppink, supra note 59.
121 Lautsi, App. No. 30814/06, EUR. CT. H.R. T 47.
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convention demands that all states be secular. 122 However, if
secularism is respected as a belief of equal legitimacy to that of
any particular religious belief, always giving it primacy in the
courts is exactly contrary to the objective, pluralistic goals of
society. While the other aspects of the Lautsi decision are
nuanced rulings re-defining particular aspects of Article 9
violations, it is this central question, "should secularism be given
preference," which disturbs so many individuals and European
states.123
V. Analogous First Amendment Law in the United States
Although the comparison is too complex to make fully here, it
is worth briefly looking at how the United States Supreme Court
has dealt with the issue of religion and education. Unlike most
European states, the U.S. has, since ratifying its Constitution,
required a separation of church and state, a concept of such
fundamental importance that it has become a common piece of
civic knowledge.124  Nonetheless, the Court has struggled with
what that means in the educational setting, especially with regard
to the question of whether individual states or communities should
be allowed to give primacy to Christian traditions over pure
secularism.125 Though nearly all recent cases regarding religious
messages in schools have been decided in favor of a pluralistic,
secular stance, many have brought bitter dissents that voice the
Christian traditions implicit in the founding of the U.S.
government, an argument very akin to that made by the Italian
government in Lautsi.126 The outrage of dissenters, parallel to that
122 Id. 16.
123 See Lautsi v Italy - A Lost Opportunity, supra note 2, 10-14 (describing the
reaction of members of the European parliament, who argue that secular states and
religious states should be treated differently under the convention).
124 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
125 See Santa Fe Independent School Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (finding in a
6-3 decision that student-led school prayer at high school football games in rural Texas is
a violation of the First Amendment.).
126 See id. at 318 (Reinquist, J., dissenting) (stating "[n]either the holding nor the
tone of the opinion is faithful to the meaning of the Establishment Clause, when it is
recalled that George Washington himself, at the request of the very Congress which
passed the Bill of Rights, proclaimed a day of 'public thanksgiving and prayer, to be
observed by acknowledging with grateful hearts the many and signal favors of Almighty
God."') (citing Presidential Proclamation, 1 Messages and Papers of the Presidents,
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of the religious states reacting to Lautsi, is that neutrality or
absence of religion is the new standard in education rather than
simply tolerance of minority religions or a prohibition against
persecution. 127 That the U.S. government, which has never
allowed its institutions to be religiously tied, still fights so bitterly
over the issue of religious exposure in schools, sheds some light
on the crisis that the Lautsi decision drew: that explicitly religious
states are being stripped of any way to inculcate religious values
among their citizens.
VI. The Grand Chamber Decision
The pivotal issue argued by the many European states and
amici curiae joining Italy in front of the grand chamber was that
the court was favoring secularism-in essence atheism-above
any religion.128 This, these many voices said, was in contravention
of the call for neutrality of the convention: favoring secularism
was not neutral.129 The majority of the Grand Chamber agreed,
though it did not rest its decision on that issue. 3 0
Rather, the court, examining the same facts and law, decided
first that the placement of the cross in classrooms does not rise to
the level of indoctrination-which would violate the convention.'3 1
Secondly, that this kind of quasi-supportive action by the state of
one religion came within a realm of action not reviewable by the
ECHR under the margin of appreciation doctrine.13 2
1789-1897, p. 64 (J. Richardson ed. 1897)); see also Lee v. Weisman 505 U.S. 577, 631-
32 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating "[iln holding that the Establishment Clause
prohibits invocations and benedictions at public-school graduation ceremonies, the
Court-with nary a mention that it is doing so, lays waste a tradition that is as old as
public school graduation ceremonies themselves, and that is a component of an even
more longstanding American tradition of nonsectarian prayer to God at public
celebrations generally.").
127 See Santa Fe Independent School Dist. at 325, (Renquist, J., dissenting) (stating
"our Establishment Clause jurisprudence simply does not mandate 'content
neutrality."').
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In holding that the display of the crucifix is not indoctrination
by the state, the court evinces a very deferential attitude towards
state religious action and oppression. In its decision, the Grand
Chamber not only held Italy's use of traditional religious symbols
in classrooms, but also supported another state's banning of
traditional muslim headwear by a teacher, under the same
principal of neutrality.' 33 That each state has such flexibility to
construe the convention's call for neutrality as it wishes does not
bode well for future opression of minority religions. But this,
apparently, is the stance towards human rights the court will
embrace, its will to pursue equality snuffed out by religious fervor
and political strength.
VII. Conclusion
Although the original decision in Lautsi v. Italy made no great
departure from precedent, it marked a decidedly stronger stance of
the ECHR against state religion. Relying on the necessity of
pluralistic teaching in upholding equality of convictions under the
law and the proselytizing effect of overtly religious symbols, the
ECHR held that the placement of crucifixes in public classrooms
violated Articles 2 and 9 of the European Convention of Human
Rights. The reaction of Catholic governments in Europe
manifested the rising tension among religious states as they are
forced to let go of the traditions that they feel bind their people.
The Grand Chamber's reversal acquiesced to those voices, but did
so without clarifying the aims of Articles 2 and 9 of the
convention. In its reversal, the court has signaled to member
states that tacit religious indoctrination will be permitted, and the
strength of the convention's call for equality has definite bounds.
The various state governments of Europe have different
histories of religious tradition, many of which persist in every day
practice.'34 In fact, it is not apparent that it was originally thought
that the new rights defined by the convention were contrary to the
133 Id. 72-74.
134 See Hooper, supra note 4 (citing the longstanding Italian state entwinement with
religion); Greenlaugh, supra note 2 (observing the threat to Lithuanian heritage posed by
removing state sponsored crosses); see also Puppink, supra note 59 (calling for a more
permissive plurality that allows religious symbols to be used by states with religious
traditions).
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values long-defined by the religious values of the European
nations.' But with this decision, the new and old values became
more squarely opposed. And when push came to shove, the court
backed down from calling state favoritism of one religion above
others a violation of human rights.
135 Murdoch, supra note 94, at 52.
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